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ABSTRACT.    This  paper  analyzes  consumption-  and  income  inequality  trends  in  Sweden 
during  the  period  1988-2005.  Similar  studies  for  the  US  have  found  that  consumption 
inequality has increased much less than income inequality in recent decades. Results in this 
paper  indicate  that  consumption  inequality  actually  decreased  in  Sweden  in  spite  of 
considerable overall increase in income inequality. The apparent contradiction can mainly be 
explained by increased saving and life cycle redistribution among high-income households. 
 
JEL Classifications: D12; D31; D63 
 




Income inequality has attracted much interest in the academic literature (for overviews, see 
e.g., Levy and Murnane, 1992; Burtless, 1995; Gottschalk and Smeeding., 1997), while few 
studies  analyze  consumption  inequality.  This  is  surprising  since  it  can  be  argued  that 
household  welfare  is  more  adequately  measured  by  consumption  rather  than  income. 
Consumption might, for example, better measure families’ permanent income (Meyer and 
Sullivan,  2006),  the  well-being  of  the  poor  (Meyer  and  Sullivan,  2003),  and  changes  in 
income inequality have welfare implications that depends crucially on the structure of credit 
and insurance markets (Krueger and Perri, 2006). 
 
A number of US studies (e.g., Cutler and Katz, 1991; Johnson and Shipp, 1997; Johnson et 
al., 2005; Krueger and Perri, 2006) have analyzed how inequality trends differ depending on 
whether income or consumption data are used. These studies generally show that consumption 
inequality  in  the  United  States  seems  to  have  increased  considerably  less  than  income 
inequality over the last decades, even though both clearly have display a positive trend. Barret 
et al. (2000), Pendakur (1998), and Gouiveia and Tavares (1995) reported similar findings 
using  data  from  Australia,  Canada,  and  Portugal,  respectively.    As  argued  by  Meyer  and 
Sullivan (2003, 2006), similarities between aggregate measures of consumption and income 
inequality might also conceal important differences between sub-groups in the population. 
Single  mothers  in  the  United  States  were,  for  example,  worse  of  when  inequality  was 
measured by income data rather than consumption data.  
 
Although a number of studies have compared consumption – and income inequality measures, 
no study has (as far as we know) been able to explain very well why measures of inequality 3 
 
differ when one uses consumption instead of income data. Various conceivable explanations 
yield quite different interpretations of equality trends. For example, income data may include 
transitory effects (e.g., capital gains realizations) that do not influence consumption patterns. 
Consumption may to some extent be based on expectations of future income. Variations in 
expenditures may merely reflect population aging (Deaton and Oaxson, 1994). Consumption 
may be heavily influence by changes in the family structure (Barret et al., 2000). In addition 
there are pure data issues. For example, income data excludes government transfers in kind 
that are important for income groups in the bottom deciles of the income distribution. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the difference between measures of consumption 
inequality  and  income  inequality  in  Sweden  using  data  from  the  Swedish  Household 
Expenditure Survey (HUT) during the period 1988-2005. In contrast to previous studies for 
other countries, the results show that consumption- and income inequality move in opposite 
directions in Sweden during the observed period. Consumption inequality decreased from 
1988 to 2003-2005; whereas income inequality increased. This development can, according to 
the results presented in the paper, mainly be explained by more consumption smoothing over 
the lifecycle, in particular among households with higher incomes. 
    
In the next section, trends in income and consumption inequality in Sweden during the study 
period  are  analyzed.  Possible  theoretical  explanations  why  measures  of  consumption 
inequality might differ from measures of income inequality are discussed in Section 3, while 
hypotheses to be tested and descriptive statistics are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, the 
econometric specification is described; whereas the results are presented in Section 6. Finally, 
section 7 summarizes and draws conclusions. 
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2.  Income and consumption inequality in Sweden 
 
The income – and consumption inequality trends in Sweden are analyzed using cross-section 
data for the periods 1988 and 2003-2005 from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (Hushållens 
utgifter, HUT) provided by Statistics Sweden. The Consumer Expenditure Survey (HUT) is a 
data base where households residing in Sweden record their expenditures during two weeks. 
The  expenditure  data  is  then  complemented  by  data  from  public  registers,  e.g.,  income 
statements from the tax register. Note that the income statistics does not include incomes such 
as allowances and student stipends. Therefore, disposable incomes may be underestimated, 
particularly in the lower end of the income distribution.  
 
In  this  paper,  the  household  is  chosen  as  the  unit  of  analysis  since  we  do  not  have  any 
knowledge of the intra-household allocation of resources. It is, however, reasonable to assume 
that the household members pool at least some of their incomes and spend it for the collective 
welfare of the household. Income is measured by disposable income (DISPI C); whereas 
consumption is measured by total expenditures (TOTEXP). Households that have reported 
zero income are excluded from the analysis because these observations include households 
where tax information and/or the adult household members’ incomes are missing. This leaves 
us with a final sample of 3,764 observations in 1988 and 6,668 observations in 2003-05. 
 
Figure 1 describes the distribution of household disposable income and total expenditures in 
1988 and 2003-05. The households have been ranked after disposable income, and grouped 
into pentiles (5%). The curves plot mean values for these pentiles, for disposable income and 
total expenditures. Note that the volumes have been adjusted to 2003–2005 year’s prices. 
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Source: HUT.  
 
We want to study changes in the absolute level of the curves, changes in their steepness, and 
changes in the relation between them. Generally the curves seem flat in comparison with the 
outcome for other countries such as the US, indicating relatively small differences in income 
and  consumption  for  a  majority  of  the  households  in  Sweden  during  the  study  period. 
However, the lowest and the highest pentile stand out. The richest 5 percent of the households 
have a notably higher share of both income and consumption, whereas the results for the first 
pentile seem strange. It combines extremely low levels of disposable income with relatively 
high  levels  of  expenditures.  Expenditures  actually  decrease  with  the  second  pentile.  As 
mentioned,  measured  disposable  incomes  do  not  include  sources  of  income  that  are  not 
reported in official tax returns, such as allowances and stipends. These could be of relative 
importance  in  the  lowest  pentile,  wherefore  incomes  there  are  underestimated.  Another 
possible  explanation  is  that  unreported  incomes  are  more  common  in  the  lowest  pentile, 
thereby explaining that expenditures are much higher than expenditures for the low-income 
households.   
 6 
 
In order to study  what  has happened with relative levels of income and consumption for 
different income groups during the study period, Table 2 describes the share of total income 
and consumption, for different pentiles, in 1988 and 2003–2005, as well as changes between 
these two periods.  
 
As can be seen from Table 2, the low income earners (pentiles 1–8, 0–40%) have lost 1.6 
percent of their relative disposable income between 1988 and 2003–05; whereas their share of 
total expenditures has increased by 1.5 percent. The richest ten percent of the sample (pentiles 
19–20, 90–100%) have, on the other hand, increased their share of disposable incomes by 1.6 
percent, while decreasing its share of expenditures by 0.5 percent.   
 
Table 2 Shares of pentiles with regard to disposable income and total expenditures, 1988 and 
2003–2005.  
Pentile  Share  Inc 88  Exp 88  Inc 03-05  Exp 03-05    Income    Expenditures 
1  0-5%  1,3  2,7  1,1  3,5  -0,2  0,8 
2  6-10%  2,1  2,5  1,9  2,5  -0,2  0 
3  11-15%  2,4  2,7  2,2  2,7  -0,2  0 
4  16-20%  2,7  3,1  2,4  3,1  -0,3  0 
5  21-25%  2,9  3  2,7  3,1  -0,2  0,1 
6  26-30%  3,2  3,3  3  3,5  -0,2  0,2 
7  31-35%  3,4  3,5  3,3  3,7  -0,1  0,2 
8  36-40%  3,7  3,9  3,6  4  -0,1  0,1 
9  41-45%  4,0  4,2  3,9  4,1  -0,1  -0,1 
10  46-50%  4,4  4,4  4,2  4,2  -0,2  -0,2 
11  51-55%  4,9  5  4,6  4,8  -0,3  -0,2 
12  56-60%  5,3  5,2  5  4,9  -0,3  -0,3 
13  61-65%  5,6  5,5  5,4  5,3  -0,2  -0,2 
14  66-70%  6,0  6  5,9  5,7  -0,1  -0,3 
15  71-75%  6,3  6,2  6,3  6,1  0,0  -0,1 
16  76-80%  6,7  6,5  6,8  6,6  0,1  0,1 
17  81-85%  7,1  6,8  7,4  6,9  0,3  0,1 
18  86-90%  7,8  7,4  8,1  7,6  0,3  0,2 
19  91-95%  8,7  8,1  9,1  7,9  0,4  -0,2 




The results presented in Table 2 indicate, moreover, that the income earners within the middle 
class  (pentiles  9–15,  40–75%)  have  decreased  their  share  of  disposable  incomes  and 
expenditures by 1.2 percent and 1.4 percent, respectively. In contrast to these findings, the 
upper  middle  class  (pentiles  16–18  (75–90%)  has  increased  both  its  share  of  disposable 
incomes by 0.6 percent, as well as its share of expenditures by 0.5 percent.  
 
Overall, there has been an increase in income inequality. The first 14 pentiles (0–70%) lost 
income relatively by 2,6 percent, while the richest 30 percent increased their income share 
correspondingly. But at the same time, consumption inequality decreased. The upper half of 
the income distribution decreased its share of total expenditures by 1.4 percent, while the 
lower half increased its share correspondingly. The main result is therefore that despite the 
increase  in  income  inequality,  consumption  inequality  has  actually  decreased  in  Sweden 
during the study period.   
 
The increased consumption equality between 1988 and 2003–05 also seem related to the age 
distribution. Households with members younger than 45 years of age had, on average, higher 
expenditures than disposable income in 1988 (Figure 3). Households with older adult 







Figure 3 Disposable income, total expenses and working income for Swedish households 
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The age distribution of disposable income and expenditures are very different in 2003-05 
(Figure 4) compared to the pattern displayed in Figure 3 for 1988.  As can be seen from 
Figure 4, and in contrast to the results in 1988, young adults (under 30 years of age) tend to 
consume more than their disposable income; whereas older individuals tend to save a large 







Figure 4 Disposable income and total expenses for Swedish households according to average 
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3.  Reasons  for  diverging  trends  between  income  and  consumption 
inequality 
 
Various  conceivable  explanations  for  diverging  trends  between  income  and  consumption 
inequality can be grouped into three categories: More consumption smoothing over short-term 
income fluctuation, more lifecycle redistribution, and changing patterns of unreported income. 
These  are  described  briefly  below.  The  empirical  analysis  aims  thereafter  to  identify  the 
import of each respective explanation.  
 
 
3.1 Consumption smoothing over the life cycle  
 As a greater share of people hold career jobs incomes are often higher in midcareer and lower 
during early education and training periods, as well as during post-career periods. As people 
expect to live longer they need to save more during periods of high incomes and redistribute 
to old age. This is especially true for high income earners. Many low income earners can 
expect to maintain their living standards relying on public and negotiated pension schemes 
regardless of how long they live. Since these schemes generally have a ceiling, high-income 
earners need to increase their savings much more in order to maintain their living standards as 
longevity increases. 
 
In  line  with  the  life  cycle  theory,  intertemporal  redistribution  may  include  bequests  to 
children.
1  If  parents  accumulate  greater  wealth  some  of  that  will  also  be  bequeathed  to 
children,  to  some  extent  already  during  the  parents’  lifetime.  If  incomes  become  more 
unevenly  distributed,  there  will  presumably  be  more  redistribution  within  families  which 
                                                 
1 Since Kotlikoff and Summers (1981), it is widely accepted that intergenerational savings constitute a large part 
of wealth accumulation, even though the exact magnitude has been subject to considerable controversy. 11 
 
helps to smooth income. One obvious phenomenon is that parents pay more as young people 
engage in longer education periods early in life. 
 
Life cycle intertemporal redistribution may also have been facilitated by an easing of liquidity 
constraints, and tax changes that place less of  a penalty on savings. Credit markets have 
developed.  Household  wealth  has  tended  to  increase  over  time.  Presumably,  demand  for 
liquidity is income elastic, meaning that as average incomes increase, households will either 
rely more on financial institutions and loans or save more in order to reduce their liquidity 
constraint.  Over  time  this  means  that  consumption  smoothing  may  have  become  more 
pronounced. 
 
The age structure would primarily affect the income-consumption gap by changing patterns of 
observed intertemporal life-cycle redistribution. This is captured by our proxy variables for 
life-cycle redistribution which depend on age. But we also test whether age has an additional 
independent effect.  
 
3.2 Consumption smoothing over short-term income fluctuation  
A basic result of life cycle income and consumption models is that household’s smooth 
consumption over periods of fluctuating income. It is therefore no surprise that consumption 
is more evenly spread in a cross-section of the population than incomes. If consumption- and 
income inequality diverge, a change in the extent of intertemporal income redistribution is an 
obvious candidate. One possibility is that households smooth consumption more over 
transitory income fluctuations.  
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Over the past decades Swedish unemployment has been much more variable than in the post-
war period. Unemployment benefits have been curtailed slightly. In particular they have a 
lower maximum amount, which gives higher income earners stronger reasons to save and 
smooth consumption. Another cause could be a faster pace of structural change that displaces 
employees, often claimed to be a result of globalization or more rapid technological change. 
Further, bonus payments, and capital income, may constitute a larger, and more volatile, share 
of peoples´ income. Also, capital markets have developed and various tax reductions have 
made saving, and thus consumption smoothing, more attractive. 
 
In addition, living expenses increase temporarily when a household has children, and is 
possibly even affected by marriage.  Birth rates in Sweden have fluctuated greatly over the 




3.3 Unreported income  
The  third  category  of  explanations  centres  on  various  sources  of  unreported  incomes. 
Unreported income is of course in itself a major data issue that casts doubt on studies that 
merely  track  income  inequality  using  registered  data.  Unreported  incomes  are  therefore  a 
relevant  argument  in  favour  of  analyzing  consumption  inequality  rather  than  income 
inequality.  They  also  imply  that  a  household´s  income-consumption  gap  may  be  quite 
different from its savings ratio. 
 
In some countries households receive significant private consumption support in kind, such as 
food stamps. In the Sweden, however, in kind support is given extensively in the form of 13 
 
schooling, health care and similar services that are not included in our measure of private 
consumption. There are essentially no in kind transfers to households´ private consumption. 
 
Instead, unreported income due to tax avoidance may be an important issue in a country like 
Sweden where income tax rates are among the highest in the world. Non-registered incomes 
presumably occur in all income categories. If this phenomenon has increased over time, then 
it  would  have  contributed  to  diverging  trends  of  income  and  consumption  inequality. 
According  to  a  number  of  studies  non-registered  income  is  more  common  among  self-
employed and on the countryside. Therefore we control for these in the empirical studies. 
 
Note  also  that  purely  data  related  issues  may  have  affected  income  and  consumption 
inequality trends over time. Attanasio et al. (2004), for example, raise a number of data issues 
in the US Consumer Expenditure Survey, but their estimates still imply that consumption 
inequality has increased much less than income inequality. Mostly, these appear to be less 
important in the Swedish context. Most important, in kind transfers such as food stamps or 











4. Hypotheses and descriptive statistics 
 
To  study  what  determines  the  difference  between  income  inequality  and  consumption 
inequality, the expenditure gap (EXPGAP)
2 and the log of the difference between disposable 
income and total expenditures (EXPDIFF) are used as dependent variables in the empirical 
analysis. The choices of independent variables are based on four explanations for diverging 
trends between income and consumption inequality, i.e., more lifecycle redistribution, more 
consumption  smoothing  over  short-term  income  fluctuation,  consumption  smoothing  over 
temporary rises in living expenses, and changing patterns of unreported income, that were 
discussed in Section 2. 
 
As people expect to live longer they need to save more during periods of high incomes and 
redistribute to old age. Many low income earners can expect to maintain their living standards 
relying on public and negotiated pension schemes regardless of how long they live. Since 
these schemes generally have a ceiling, high-income earners need to increase their savings 
much more in order to maintain their living standards as longevity increases. We thus expect 
that higher disposable income (DISPI C) is positively related to the expenditure gap, i.e, 
high-income households tend to save more than low-income households.   
 
Households might also consume more and save less if they expect that their future income 
(FUTI C) is high, suggesting that future income is negatively related to the expenditure gap. 
To define expectations of future income, all the households were ranked according to the 
average age of the adults in the household. The expectation of how future income develops 
for  a  given  household  is  then  calculated  as  the  average  income  of  all  households  whose 
                                                 
2 EXPGAP , the expenditure gap, is defined as disposable income divided by total expenditures, i.e., EXPGAP = 
DISPI C/TOTEXP. 15 
 
average age is older than the actual household. Thus, the proxy for how the future income of 
household i develop (where i indicates the household’s rank in the age distribution) is defined 
as  
 




i   1
1
, for all j > i  (such that AGEj  > AGEi).   
 
This means that a household would take account of how income tends to evolve over the life 
cycle in households that are older than itself.
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The income potential is defined as the difference between household disposable income and 
future  income,  i.e.,    I CPOT  =  DISPI C  –  FUTI C.  The  variable  I CPOT  expresses 
directly  the  hypothesis  that  households  with  high  future  income  compared  to  its  current 
income will want to smooth consumption by consuming more out of current income and thus 
decrease its savings ratio. One might think that age is an important own variable that affects 
life cycle redistribution. But age enters the calculation of INCPOT, and is in fact closely 
correlated with INCPOT. In the regressions we report below, age is therefore not included as 
a separate variable (but doing so does not affect the qualitative results). 
 
In the presence of wealth, additional saving may appear less necessary. There are no good 
measures of wealth, but it is proxied here by the number of rooms in the residence (ROOMS). 
 
                                                 
3 Admittedly, this “peerless” way of calculating may be a very rough approximation of how households estimate 
their future income. In a more refined estimate, households would consider the households would weigh more 
heavily incomes of households that may be considered their peers, with regard to e. g. socioeconomic group, 
education and profession. 16 
 
The variable I CPOT, merely captures the average development of incomes over the life 
cycle. A household will also weigh in its relative position. This is particularly important since 
pensions and other social insurance schemes have ceilings, so that households´ motives save 
privately increase disproportionately as income exceeds the ceiling. A high relative income 
(RELI C) is thus expected to be positively correlated with the expenditure gap. This variable 
is included in the model by dividing disposable income with the average disposable income of 
households in the same age category.  
 
To capture the second explanation, short term fluctuations of income, it would have been 
desirable to have data on capital income to control for short-term income fluctuations. This 
information is, however, not present in the data. Instead, an unemployment dummy variable 
(DU EMP)  is  included  in  the  model  to  study  whether  households  that  have  at  least  one 
unemployed household member reduces it expenditures. The variable is thus expected to be 
negatively  related  to  the  expenditure  gap.  Temporary  increases  of  living  expenses  due  to 
family composition is proxied by the number of children in the household (CHILDRE ), 
whether any of the adult household members is a student (DSTUD) and the civil status of the 
adult household members (DCIV).  
   
The third explanation, occurrence of unreported income is proxied by whether any of the 
household members are self-employed (DE TREP) and whether they are residents in a city 
(DCITY).  
 
Means, standard deviations, and definitions for all the variables used in the empirical analysis 
are displayed in Table 1. The variables included are further discussed in Section 5.  
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Table 1: Means, standard deviations, and definitions of variables 
   1988  2003–05    
   Mean  sd  Mean  sd    
EXPGAP  1.080  0.460  1.224  0.600  Disposable income divided by 
expenditures  
DISPI C  140833  74582  280780  191979  Disposable income for household  
FUTI C  79008  8338  166722  18218  Average income of all households 
whose average age is older than 
household  
I CPOT  –4643  31367  –6653  94745  The difference between household 
disposable income and future 
income. 
RELI C  1.003  0.4557  –0.489  6.458  Disposable income divided by 
average income for households in 
the same age.  
AGE  42.96  15.77  47.86  15.79  Average age for adult members in  
CIVSTAT  0.579  0.494  0.545  0.498  Dummy variable that takes the 
value one if the household is 
classified as a single household, 
otherwise zero.  
CITY  0.315  0.465  0.362  0.481  Dummy variable that takes the 
value one if the household lived in 
Stockholm, Gothenburg or Malmö, 
otherwise zero.  
ROOMS  4.199  8.363  3.575  1.762  Number of rooms of household 
habitation.  
CHILDRE   0.513  0.909  0.523  0.945  Number of children in household  
STUDE T  0.166  0.372  0.183  0.387  Dummy variable that takes the 
value one if at least one adult 
household member is a student, 
otherwise zero. 
E TREP  0.060  0.238  0.084  0.278  Dummy variable that takes the 
value one if at least one adult 
household member is self-
employed, otherwise zero. 
U EMP        0.060  0.237  Dummy variable that takes the 
value one if at least one adult 





5. Empirical model 
 
The  results  presented  in  the  previous  section  indicate  that  income  inequality  has  risen  in 
Sweden  from  1988  through  2005,  whereas  consumption  inequality  has  decreased.  The 
following  regression  (Model  I)  is  estimated  in  order  to  investigate  what  can  explain  the 
observed difference in consumption and income inequality in Sweden during the study period. 
 
, 9 8
6 5 4 3 2 1 0
it it it it it it
it it it it it it it
DU EMP DE TREP DSTUD CHILDRE  ROOMS
DCITY DCIV AGE RELI C FUTI C DISPI C Y
ε α α
α α α α α α α
+ + + + +
+ + + + + + + =
 
 
where the dependent variable ( it Y ) measures the difference in consumption and income for a 
given household i in period t. This variable is measured using the expenditure gap (EXPGAP) 
and the log of the difference between disposable income and total expenditures (EXPDIFF). 
When the log of the difference between disposable income and total expenditures (EXPDIFF) 
is used as the dependent variable, all independent income variables are also logged.  
 
The  independent  variables  have  been  discussed  above.  An  unemployment  dummy 
(DU EMP) is therefore included as an independent variable in the empirical model. This 
variable does not exist in the data in 1988 and can therefore only be used in the estimations 
for the 2003-05 sample. 
 
In a second specification, disposable income is omitted from the estimation since it is a linear 
transformation of I CPOT . The estimated model (Model II) can in this case be written 
 
, 10 9 8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0
it it it it it it
it it it it it
DU EMP DE TREP DSTUD CHILDRE  ROOMS
DCITY DCIV AGE RELI C I CPOT Y
ε β β β β β
β β β β β β
+ + + + +




6  Results 
 
We performed two sets of regressions. The first was performed on unlogged variables, using 
the expenditure gap as the dependent variable; whereas the log difference between disposable 
income and expenditures was used as the dependent variable in the second regression. With 
logged variables, coefficients may be compared with each other and assess whether their size 
have increased or decreased between the years 1988 and 2003–05. The results from the first 
regression are presented in Table 2. 
 
In Table 2, model II is our preferred specification in line with the framework given above. 
Model I just a “naïve” regression where disposable income, age and other income variables 
are entered directly.  
 
As can be seen from the results presented in Table 2, disposable income is highly significant 
in both 1988 and in 2003–05. The estimated coefficient indicates that the expenditure gap 
increases when the household have higher disposable income per household member. Thus, 
high income households tend to spend less of their disposable income (i.e., save more) than 
households  with  lower  income.  This  confirms  the  hypothesis  that  households  with  high-
income earners save relatively more than low-income earners in order to maintain their living 






Table 2 Regression results using the expenditure gap (EXPGAP) as the dependent 
variable, t–values (Robust-White) in parentheses.  
 
  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II 
  1988  1988  2003–2005  2003–2005 
DISPI C  2.5e-06    2.2e-06   
  (5.9)    (2.8)   
FUTI C  –1.5e-05    –6.8e-06   
  (–3.3)    (–1.8)   
I CPOT    –4.17e-06    –3.7e-06 
    (–5.7)    (–3.2) 
RELI C  1.7e-05  1.3e-05  –0.00015  –0.00015 
  (0.7)  (0.51)  –0.27)  (–0.39) 
AGE  –0.0031    0.00037   
  (–1.4)    (0.12)   
CIVSTAT  –0.14  0.10  –0.12)  0.26 
  (–3.3)  (4.7)  (–1.1)  (5.7) 
CITY  –0.068  –0.077  –0.11  –0.11 
  (–3.1)  (–3.6)  (–2.4)  (–2.6) 
ROOMS  –0.00052  –0.00017  –0.065  –0.050 
  (–0.74)  (–0.26)  (–2.5)  (–2.1) 
CHILDRE   –0.060  –0.094  –0.029  –0.066 
  (–7.3)  (–11)  (–2.2)  (–5.5) 
STUDE T  –0.048  –0.028  (–0.025)  0.029 
  (–2.4)  (–0.15)  (–1.3)  (0.75) 
E TREP  –0.11  –0.010  –0.017  –0.017 
  (–3.4)  (–3.1)  (–0.3)  (–0.28) 
U EMP      0.080  0.12 
      (1.7)  (2.0) 
CO ST  2.2  1.1  2.1  1.3 
  (5.1)  53.24  (2.9)  (16) 
R
2  0.12  0.10  0.15  0.14 
 
The results presented in Table 2 indicate, moreover, that the expenditure gap decrease when 
future income increases, supporting the hypothesis that households with relatively high future 
income save less money than households that are characterized by relatively low future 21 
 
incomes. Thus, consumers seem to smooth consumption over the life cycle.  Prospective 
higher future incomes make people save less out of current income. This view is more directly 
expressed in Model II where the income potential is included in the estimated model instead 
of disposable – and future income. According to the results, the higher the future income is 
relative to current income, the less inclined to save will the household be. This suggests that 
an increase in life-cycle saving may indeed be an important factor behind the diverging trend 
in income- and consumption equality. 
 
However, our second hypothesis of consumption smoothing over temporary income 
fluctuations, also receives some support. The coefficients for unemployment are significant 
and of the right sign. The hypothesis, of smoothing due to temporary fluctuations in living 
expenses is corroborated as the coefficient estimates for the presence of children and marital 
status are significant. The expenditure gap decreases if the household lives in the big cities in 
Sweden or if there are many children present in the household. Households with many 
children do not save more in order to redistribute income between generations. On the 
contrary, these households save less than households without children. 
 
The hypothesis concerning unreported income receives mixed support. The coefficient 
estimate for  self-employment is not significant. The coefficient for living in a city is 
significant, but could pick up other characteristics than unregistered income.  
 
Finally, our proxy for wealth, the number of rooms in the dwelling, is also significant. 
 
To see whether the regression coefficients economic significance have changed between 1988 
and 2003-05, Table 3 show results from regressions on logged variables. Unfortunately this 22 
 
can only be done for Model I since Model II includes the variable INCPOT which is negative 
for many observations. In the logged version  the effects of inflation oncoefficient values are 
discarded. We focus the analysis on whether the estimated income coefficients have changed 
between 1988 and 2003-05. According to the results, disposable income and future income is 
still positive and highly significant determined both in 1988 and in 2003–05. High income 
households thus tend to save more and prospective higher future incomes makes people save 
less out of current income.  
 
The results indicate that a 1% increase in disposable income in 1988 increased the difference 
between disposable income and expenditures with 0.53%, while the corresponding increase in 
2003-05 was 0.80%. Thus, high-income earners tend to save more of their disposable income 
in 2003-05 compared to 1988, explaining parts of the observed difference between income 













Table 3 Regression results using the log of the difference between disposable income and 
total expenditures (EXPDIFF) as the dependent variable, t–values (Robust-White) in 
parentheses. 
  Model I    Model I   
  1988    2003–2005   
ln DISPI C  0.53    0.80   
  (2.9)    (8.6)   
ln FUTI C  2.7    1.4   
  (2.1)    (2.7)   
ln I CPOT         
         
ln RELI C  0.16    0.16   
  (3.6)    (6.1)   
AGE  0.024    0.016   
  (2.6)    (4.5)   
CIVSTAT  0.14    0.19   
  (0.5)    (2.0)   
CITY  –0.22    –0.069   
  (–2.8)    (–1.7)   
ROOMS  .00059    –0.034   
  (0.22)    (–2.4)   
CHILDRE   –0.17    –0.056   
  (–4.5)    (–2.8)   
STUDE T  0.22    0.063   
  (2.6)    (1.3)   
E TREP  0.10    0.11   
  (0.64)    (1.8)   
U EMP      0.25   
      (2.9)   
CO ST  –29    –17   
  (–2)    (–2.9)   
R




The concentration index (gini coefficient over distribution of income for both disposable 
income and expenditure) shows that income inequality increased by 12,3 percent between 
1988 and 2003, while expenditure inequality decreased by 5,2 percent (Table 4). To quantify 
how much of the change in the gap between how income- and consumption inequality can be 
explained by changes the independent variables, we first estimated the predicted expenditure 
gap for each household in 1988 and 2003-05 using the statistically significant estimated 
coefficient values in Table 3 (Model I).  
 
The second step in the simulation is to substitute the estimated coefficients of the 2003-05 
regression into the equation for the year 1988. Table 5 shows the results. Without the changes 
in coefficient estimates for DISP and FUTI C, that capture changes in lifetime income 
redistribution, consumption inequality would not have declined as much. This was, however, 
more than compensated by the change in coefficient estimates for the number of children 
(CHILDRE ) and self-employment (E TREP). The changes in these coefficient estimates 
instead help to shrink the gap between income and consumption equality changes over time.  
In sum, the observed changes in coefficient estimates during the study period do not seem to 
explain much of the increasing gap between income and consumption inequality.  
 
Table 4 Simulations of the gini coefficient using coefficients from the 2003 regression in 
the estimated equation for 1988 
   1988  2003 
Change 1988 - 
2003 
I COME I EQUALITY  0,27  0,31  12,3% 
EXPE DITURE I EQUALITY  0,23  0,22  -5,2% 
  PREDICTED EXPGAP  0,24  0,22  -7,8% 
  Replacing coefficients for 
DISPI C  -6,6% 
FUTI C  -7,6% 
CHILDRE  + CIVSTAT  -10,8% 
E TREP + CITY  -8,1% 
ALL        -9,4% 
 
 
Instead the mystery is resolved by taking into account the changes in the distribution of  the 
independent  variables  themselves.  Two  variables  have  changed  much  between  1988  and 25 
 
2003. One is the average age which has increased with five years (similar to life expectancy in 
Sweden). But the coefficient estimates for age as an explanatory variable is small and hardly 
significant. The other variable that has changed much is the level and variance of income. 
Partly this is due to inflation, but real incomes have increased by about 30 percent over the 
period and the standard deviation has increased much more than the mean. This, then, seems 





The purpose of this paper has been to study the difference between income – and consumption 
inequality  in  Sweden  during  the  period  1988-2005  using  data  from  the  Household 
Expenditure Survey (HUT). This is of importance since it can be argued that consumption 
better measures families’ well-being than income. Income data is, for example, influenced by 
transitory changes (e.g., capital income), does not take into account expectations of future 
incomes,  and  disregards  incomes  that  is  not  registered  (e.g.,  student  allowances);  thereby 
underestimating the well-being of low-income households.     
 
Most previous empirical studies have used data from the US and these studies have in general 
found that both consumption and income inequality has increased, but consumption inequality 
seems to have increased less then income inequality. However, the results presented in this 
paper indicated that the Swedish experience is different. In Sweden, consumption inequality 
has decreased during the study period in spite of an overall increase in income inequality. It is 
found that the diverging trends between consumption - and income inequality can to some 
extent be explained by increased savings among the high income individuals. This is in line 26 
 
with  Dew-Becker  and  Gordon  (2005),  who  found  that  the  overall  increase  in  income 
inequality  in  the  US  mainly  was  due  to  an  increase  within  the  richest  10  percent  of  the 
population. 
 
Note that we have not been able to control for a number of explanations (see Section 2) that 
might explain why Swedish consumption has become more equal since 1988, in spite of 
increasing inequality in registered incomes. Unemployment was, for example, exceptionally 
low in Sweden up until the early 1990s, but more like in other countries subsequently, giving 
rise to increased short term income volatility.  
 
Household life cycle redistribution has probably also increased more in Sweden than in the 
US. Sweden had a relatively low share of young people in college education during the 1980s. 
This share increased dramatically during the 1990s. At the same time the public pension 
system was reformed and cut back, increasing interest in retirement saving. A number of 
changes in the tax system also contributed to an increase in the household savings rate from 
around zero to around four to five percent of household income after the mid-nineties.  These 
trends might explain why older individuals increased their savings ratio during the study 
period (Figure 3), whereas expenditures for younger individuals in the end of the period on 
average where higher than their registered income (Figure 4). Note also that the share of 
nonregistered income in connection with tax avoidance gradually has increased over time in 
Sweden; which can explain diverging trends in consumption and income inequality. Much of 
this has occurred in sectors where it is conceivable that jobless individuals may have been 
able to earn unregistered income.  
 27 
 
This paper can be seen as a first attempt (at least to our knowledge) to discriminate between 
trends in consumption – and income inequality in Sweden. The discussion above indicates 
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